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The dissemination of Fordist techniques in Western Europe during the golden age of capitalism 
led to terrific rates of auto production growth and massive motorization. However, since the 
late 1960s this process showed signs of exhaustion because demand from the lowest segments 
began to stagnate. Moreover, during the seventies, the intensification of labour conflicts, the 
multiplication of oil prices and the strengthened competitiveness of Japanese rivals in the 
world market significantly squeezed profits of European car assemblers. Key companies from 
the main producer countries, such as British Leyland, FIAT, Renault and SEAT, recorded huge 
losses and were forced to restructure. 
 The degree of success in coping with the stagflation crisis depended on two groups of factors. 
On the one hand, successful survival depended on strategies followed by the firms to promote 
economies of scale and scope, process and product innovation, related diversification, 
internationalization and, sometimes, changes of ownership. On the other hand, firms 
benefited from long-term path-dependent growth in their countries of origin’s industrial 
systems. Indeed, two of the main winners of the period, Toyota and Volkswagen, can rightly be 
seen as outstanding examples of Confucian and Rhine capitalism. Both types of coordinated 
capitalism contributed to the success of their main car assemblers during the stagflation 
slump. However, since then, global convergence with Anglo-Saxon capitalism may have eroded 
some of the institutional bases of their strength. 
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1. The end of the golden age 
 
 
According to a vast number of historians and economists, the long phase of growth in the 
period 1950-73 is considered to be the golden age of capitalism. In particular, Angus Maddison 
pointed out that global recessions (defined as a fall in real GDP) became increasingly rare in 
advanced economies. By analysing the history of slumps for a sample of sixteen leading OECD 
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economies since 1871, Maddison confirmed that the worst moment for economic growth was 
1931, when fourteen out of the sixteen countries under consideration experienced recession.1 
In 1938 there were still four economies from the sample that were in crisis, and by the end of 
the Second World War the number of countries in recession had risen again to ten. However, 
since the late 1940s, the trend in the number of crises tended to diminish. During the period 
1959-1966 no country within the sample experienced any recession. Stability prevailed until 
1973. The near disappearance of crisis in the most advanced market economies significantly 
contributed to a sustained improvement in real per capita income in the West. The lack of 
slumps during the golden age also made possible full employment, the development of welfare 
states and a steady decrease in inequality within the advanced countries.2 
The automotive industry contributed to this post-WWII economic boom through the spread of 
Fordism. In 1950 automobile production was concentrated in the United States, which 
manufactured more than 8 million vehicles. At the time, the largest European producer was 
the United Kingdom, which accounted for less than one-tenth of US output. The best Asian 
performer was Japan, but its output remained below 32,000 units. The US’s astonishing world 
hegemony within the industry derived from the use of Fordist techniques. According to David 
Landes, Henry Ford was in fact the most innovative entrepreneur in modern business.3 He 
adopted innovations such as interchangeable parts and the moving assembling line, 
standardised the product, replaced piece-work with an hourly wage system of pay and gave 
control of the production process to engineers. With such innovations, he achieved 
tremendous economies of scale in production on the eve of the First World War. Such 
innovations made the Ford Model T increasingly cheaper, and it became the world’s 
blockbuster vehicle prior to 1920. During the interwar years, the plants in Highland Park and 
River Rouge were visited by the world’s leading businessman whose brands are still at the top 
of the industry today, such as Louis Renault, Giovanni Agnelli and Kiichiro Toyoda.4 The 
experience of the Ford Model T was also very influential on projects to create a very cheap 
vehicle for the lowest market segment, the main example being Ferdinand Porsche’s 
Volkswagen Beetle.5 
However, Ford was not the only great innovator of the industry located in Michigan. As Alfred 
Chandler demonstrated many years ago, Alfred Sloan’s General Motors also introduced key 
changes such as product differentiation, consumer credit and marketing, which enabled the 
firm to take full advantage of economies of scope.6 The extent to which Ford’s main rival 
                                                          
1 Maddison, Dynamic Forces..., Table 4.8. 
2 See, among others: Armstrong, Glyn & Harrison, Capitalism since 1945…, 117-200. Marglin, ‘Lessons of 
the Golden Age…, 1-38.  Crafts, ‘The Great Boom…, 42-62. Temin, ‘The Golden Age…, 3-22. Maddison, 
The World Economy…, 125-149. Brenner, The Economics of Global…, 157-227. Eichengreen, The 
European economy…, 16-51. Catalan, ‘From the Great Depression to…, 15-45. 
3 Landes, Dynasties, Fortunes and…, 129. Landes, ‘L’automobile e lo sviluppo…, 38-50. 
4 Tolliday & Zeitlin (eds.), ‘Introduction…, 3.  Shiomi , ‘Introduction…, 2. 
5 Nelson, Small wonder…, 42-98. Abelshauser, The Dymanics…, 87-106. 
6 Chandler, Giant Enterprise. Ford, General Motors…, 25-175.  See also:  Chandler, Scale and Scope…, 1-
49 and 205-212. Chandler, ‘Organizational Capabilities and…, 79-100. Chandler, Shaping the Industrial 
Century…, 3-18. The  capabilities of large Detroit’s firms as key assets of the industry has been recently 
confirmed by Klepper: Klepper, The capabilities of new firms…, 645-666. Klepper, The origins and 
growth…, 15-20. See as well, Boyer & Freyssenet, The productive models…, 36-76.  
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adopted the M-form of organisation is still a matter of controversy,7 but the fact remains that 
this second wave of radical innovation within the industry helped GM to overtake Ford in the 
1920s. In any case, capabilities in production, distribution and organisation reinforced the role 
of Detroit as the world capital of the motor industry until the golden age. 
Overseas attempts to imitate Ford and General Motors were unable to achieve full success 
within the unstable period that culminated in the Great Depression of the 1930s and the 
Second World War. Neither Ford subsidiaries in Europe or Opel, which was bought by GM in 
1929, recorded significant successes when they tried to replicate overseas the innovations 
conceived in America. Although, there were attempts among most of producers established in 
Europe, demand was too weak during the interwar period to permit the successful 
incorporation of mass production techniques. Foreign-exchange controls prevented, as well, 
acceptable performance of the American subsidiaries in Europe.8 
 But efforts began again with renewed vigour after 1945. During the golden age of economic 
growth, European firms tried to replicate the innovations coming out of Michigan in their own 
countries. A lack of recessions encouraged the high investments required by an industry with 
such large economies of scale and scope. As a result, car production rose very fast in countries 
with relatively large markets and incomes. Britain’s automobile output rose from less than 
800,000 units in 1950 to 2.1 million in 1973. France and Germany performed even better, each 
climbing from less than 400,000 units annually to more than 3 million. Italy was to 
manufacture nearly 2 million vehicles in 1973, and Belgium and Spain, around 1 million each. 
Sweden produced approximately a half-million. However, at the other end of Eurasia, Japan 
was achieving the most impressive record, reaching an output in excess of 7 million of units in 
1973 (Table 1). 
                                                          
7 Freeland, The Struggle for Control…, 295-393. 
8 Wilkins & Hill, American Enterprise..., 270-285. Reich, The Fruits of..., 107-119. Turner, General Motors 
and..., 1-12. Nehmer, Ford, General Motors and..., 60-156. 
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Table 1. Main producers of automobiles (Thousands of vehicles)
1973 1985 2015
1 United States 12638 1 Japan 12135 1 China 24503
2 Japan 7081 2 United States 11538 2 United States 12100
3 Germany FR 3949 3 Germany FR 4554 3 Japan 9278
4 France 3242 4 France 3083 4 Germany 6033
5 U K 2164 5 U S S R 2249 5 South Korea 4556
6 Italy 1960 6 Canada 1931 6 India 4126
7 U S S R 1604 7 Italy 1571 7 Mexico 3565
8 Canada 1575 8 Spain 1386 8 Spain 2733
9 Belgium * 1016 9 U K 1349 9 Brazil 2429
10 Spain 823 10 Belgium * 1035 10 Canada 2283
11 Brazil 733 11 Brazil 966 11 France 1970
12 Australia 410 12 Sweden 463 12 Thailand 1915
13 Swden 383 13 Australia 438 13 U K 1682
14 South Africa * 295 14 Mexico 425 14 Russia 1394
15 Mexico 283 15 Poland 388 15 Czech Republ. 1304
Note: (*) Mainly assembled from imported parts
Sources : United Nations , Industrial Statistics Yearbook , New York. Organisation Internationale des  Constructeurs
d' Automobi les , World Production by Country , Paris .  
During the late golden age, Japan increased its output at an amazing rate and began to 
inundate the world market with its automobiles.9 However, global economic crises reappeared 
after 1973. According to Maddison, ten out of the sixteen leading industrial countries were in 
recession again by 1975. In 1981, six countries were still suffering through a slump. Both 
unemployment and inflation peaked throughout the 1970s and, subsequently, inequality and 
macroeconomic instability tended to increase in most countries in the developed world. 
Inflation and unemployment seemed simultaneously out of control until the mid-1980s. 
The so-called stagflation crisis was the first significant slump in Western Europe since the 
1940s. This crisis not only marked a turning point in terms of growth, but it also revealed that 
industrial hegemony was beginning to shift from West to East. In the case of the motor 
industry, the 1970s slump led to Japan replacing the United States as the world leader in the 
number of manufactured automobiles. In fact, by 1985, Japan’s output stood above 12 million 
units, whereas the US remained slightly below this threshold. The nation of the rising sun was, 
at the time, the only Asian country appearing on the list of the top 15 car producers worldwide 
in number of units, but South Korea had already seen remarkable growth during those years10. 
Since 1985 the shift in industrial hegemony towards Asia seems to have accelerated. As can be 
seen from Table 1, Japan was the only Asian manufacturer on the list of 15 top producers in 
1985, whereas by 2015 the list included five countries from the continent, with China, South 
Korea, India and Thailand joining the club (in 2014 Indonesia appeared, as well, in the fifteenth 
place of the rank). The reverse tended to happen with Europe, whose number of producers 
                                                          
9 Maxcy, The Multinational Automobile…, 109-113. Udagawa, ‘The Development of Production…, 107-
119.  Odagiri & Goto, ‘The Japanese System of Innovation…, 98-103. Shiomi, ‘The Formation of 
Assembler Networks…, 31. See also Chang in Lin & Chang, ‘Should Industrial Policy in…, 488-492. 
10 Amsden, Asia’s Next Giant…  Chang, ‘The political  economy…, 131-157. Chang in Lin & Chang, ‘Should 
Industrial Policy in…, 488-492.Catalan, ‘Strategic policy revisited…, 207-230.  
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among the top 15 worldwide declined from eight to just five. Germany, Spain, France and 
United Kingdom survived in the top list, but this was not the case with Sweden, Italy and 
Belgium. The latter two had already recorded a marked relative decline during the stagflation 
crisis. The fall of the United Kingdom throughout the slump was also notable: it sank from fifth 
to ninth position between 1973 and 1985. There was only one European newcomer in the 
2015 list: the Czech Republic. 
The aim of the special issue of Business History is to analyse how the European automobile 
industry adjusted to the first great slump after more than two decades of fast growth. Our 
analysis begins by considering country rankings of automobile output based on the conviction 
that there were macroeconomic and policy factors which affected firm performance during the 
stagflation crisis. However, success in dealing with the slump and adapting to the new Asian 
competition depended at least as much on strategic decisions taken by single firms during the 
later years of the golden age and on the way they adapted to the new conditions created by 
mounting labour costs, the collapse of Bretton Woods and the skyrocketing price of crude oil 
during the two consecutive shocks in 1973-74 and 1979-80. As business historians, we must be 
well aware of the significance of path dependence in the choice of techniques, products and 
organisational models.  
 
 
2. Stagflation and the crisis of Fordism 
 
The 1973-85 depression has been seen as a crisis of Fordism. In fact, if we look closely at the 
main European manufacturing firms on the eve of the slump, we notice that nearly all had 
based their expansion on taking advantage of large series production of a fairly cheap 
standardised model for mass consumption. The most notable case was the Volkswagen Beetle, 
which replaced the Ford Model T as the most produced model in history: by 1972, the Käfer, 
with more than 15 million units built, had overtaken Henry Ford’s blockbuster.11 
The Beetle enabled the Wolfsburg-based company to become the third largest manufacturer 
worldwide in number of units by 1973, just behind the traditional leaders who had shared the 
main positions on the podium since the 1920s, General Motors and Ford. Germany had, 
however, also made other attempts to manufacture popular models, whose origins date back 
to the interwar years. An outstanding example is the Opel Kadett, a GM effort.12 It was 
launched in 1936, when Heinrich Nordhoff served as technical director of GM’s German 
subsidiary. As is well known, Nordhoff played a paramount role in VW’s success during the 
golden age. In fact, Opel was the German-based brand that most effectively imitated Ford’s 
                                                          
11 Eckermann, Vom Damfwagen zum…, 166. 
12 Turner, General Motors and..., 40-48. 
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methods of mass production in the country.13 Completely new versions of the Kadett were 
relaunched by Opel from 1962 onwards. 
The success of the volume strategy during the golden age can also be seen from the fact that 
Fiat and Renault were the next highest European brands in the world ranking, holding the 
seventh and eight positions, respectively, in the 1973 column in Table 2. The Agnelli family’s 
company had already tried to promote the production of small cars in the interwar years, 
achieving its greatest success with the 500 Topolino, which was launched in 1936 and recorded 
sales of around a half-million units until 1955.14 Throughout the golden age, Fiat’s Nuova 500 
played a comparable role to the German Beetle in Italy, achieving total sales of about 2.8 
million units up to 1975. In 1971, the Turin-based firm launched another future blockbuster in 
the popular segment, the 127, which was to record sales of 3.7 units through 1983.15  
Renault was nationalised in 1945 and changed its name to Régie Nationale des Usines Renault. 
Pierre Lefaucheux, the chief executive officer, could be considered the French Henry Ford, 
according to Jean-Louis Loubet.16 The firm conceived and began to produce transfer machines, 
which facilitated standardisation. Patrick Fridenson stresses that Renault preceded Toyota in 
developing the same type of machines by more than ten years.17  
Lefaucheux also gave priority to reducing the number of models manufactured at Billancourt 
and to launching the first popular vehicle commercialised by Renault, the 4CV. Production of 
the 4CV climbed from 610 units in 1947 to more than 100,000 units by 1952. Maximum output 
of the 4CV was reached in 1955, when production was about 140,000.18 Later, Billancourt’s 
cheapest model suffered acutely from the competition waged by Citröen’s 2CV, or deux 
chevaux. But, again, throughout the sixties, Renault’s R4 was also responsible for the 
Billancourt-based brand’s climbing positions among the world’s top manufacturers. Another 
success of the firm in the so-called A-segment was the R5 model, which began to be sold in 
1972.  
 
 
                                                          
13 Reich, The Fruits of Fascism…, 107. See for the previous period: Flik, Von Ford lernen?..., 105-241. Opel 
also tried to participate in the Volkswagen project, but unsuccessfully. Its truck plant in Brandenburg 
was a result of this attempt. Turner, General Motors and…, 31-48. 
14 Fiat Archivio Storico, Fiat: Le Fasi della…., 122. Castronovo, FIAT 1909-1999. Un secolo…, 518-564. 
Landes, ‘L’automobile e lo sviluppo..., 59. 
15 Fiat Archivio Storico, Fiat: Le Fasi della…., 122. 
16 Loubet, Renault..., 105-107. Loubet, Citroën, Peugeot…, 49. 
17 Fridenson, ‘Fordism and Quality..., 164. 
18 Loubet, Histoire de l’automobile…, 278-294. 
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Table 2. Top ten manufacturers of automobiles (Thousand units)
1973 1985 2015
1 GM 7005 1 GM 7090 1 Toyota 10150
2 Ford 5871 2 Ford 5551 2 Volkswagen 9930
3 Volkswagen 2335 3 Toyota 3541 3 GM 9800
4 Toyota 2308 4 Nissan 2734 4 Renault-Nissan 8220
5 Chrysler 2217 5 Volkswagen 2398 5 Hyundai 7880
6 Nissan 2031 6 Chrysler 1870 6 Ford 6640
7 FIAT 1417 7 Renault 1638 7 FIAT-Chrysler 4610
8 Renault 1415 8 PSA Peugeot 1631 8 Honda 4478
9 BLMC 876 9 FIAT 1420 9 PSA Peugeot 2970
10 Peugeot 766 10 Honda 1265 10 Suzuki 2543
Notes : Ford 1973 & 1985, sa les . Toyota 1973 & 1985, production in Japan. Chrys ler 1973 & 1985, production in the US and Canada.
Nissan, output abroad, estimated. FIAT, production in 1974.  FIAT, Honda,Peugeot & Suzuki  in 2015, production of passenger cars .
Rest of companies , vehicle sa les  in 2015.
Sources : Bordenave (2000) . Flynn (2000). Shimizu (2000) . Jürgens  (2000). Belzowski  (2000). Hanada (2000).
Camuffo & Volpato (2000). Freyssenet (2000). Freyssenet & Mair (2000). Loubet (2000). Freyssenet & Mair (2000).
Statis ta  (2016), Leading automobi le manufacturers  in 2015, based on vehicle sa les .   
 
The need to exploit economies of scale more effectively was one of the causes behind the 
mergers that led to the birth of British Leyland Motor Corporation in 1968.19 Austin and Morris 
had already attempted to manufacture small vehicles prior to the Second World War. 
Moreover, BLMC could rely on the experience accumulated since Alec Issigonis had designed 
the original Mini in the late 1950s, which, according to Timothy Whisler, would become the 
most remarkable success of Britain motor industry in foreign markets.20 
As can be seen in Table 2, BLMC still played a significant role as a world producer at the 
outbreak of the first oil shock—namely, eighth position—and its output exceeded 800,000 
units in the early 1970s. Similarly, in France, Peugeot had gained familiarity with the most 
popular market segments since the launch of its 204 model in 1965. According to Loubet, 
Peugeot shifted from a specialist strategy to a volume one at that moment.21 Moreover, when 
the family bought Citroën in 1976 and created the PSA group, it also inherited the experience 
of the brand owned by Michelin since 1935: Citroën had manufactured another of the 
blockbusters of the popular segment during the golden age, the deux chevaux.  
Although Spain did not have any brand that counted among the world’s top manufacturers, its 
emergence as the tenth leading producer, as seen in Table 1, was a result mainly of the 
production of popular cars such as the Fiat 600 manufactured by SEAT and the R4 
manufactured by FASA, Renault’s subsidiary in Spain.22 BLMC’s plant in Belgium manufactured 
the Mini. Ford’s plant in Ghent also assembled large series Dearborn models, such as the 
                                                          
19 Foreman-Peck, Bowden & McKinlay, The British Motor…, 89-131. 
20 Whisler, ‘The outstanding potential…, 8-14. See also Church, The rise and decline…, 85-87.  Foreman-
Peck, Bowden & McKinlay, The British Motor…, 137-145. Whisler, The British Motor… 
21 Loubet, La Maison Peugeot…, 362-379. 
22 Solé, SEAT (1950-1990)…, 33-57. García Ruiz, ‘La evolución de la…, 133-163. Sánchez, La implantación 
industrial…, 147-175. Tappi, Una impresa italiana…, 40-134. Sánchez, Renault y Citroën…, 307-328. 
Catalan, ‘Strategic policy revisited…, 207-230.  Fernández-de-Sevilla, ´Renault in Spain…, 471-492. 
Fernández-de-Sevilla, ‘Los orígenes del clúster…, 135-151. Fernández-de-Sevilla, ‘La emergencia del 
capitalismo…, 135-168. Catalan, ‘The Barcelona Cluster..., 12-23. 
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Escort, although these were targeted at higher market segments. The common tariff of the EEC 
and its convenient location within the heart of Western Europe made Belgium an attractive 
place to assemble cars.23 In addition to the companies just mentioned, Citroën and Peugeot 
had also factories in Belgium since the inter-war period. General Motors opened a plant in 
Antwerp in 1965 and Volkswagen inaugurated its Belgian assembly facility in 1972. Even the 
Swedish firm Volvo, which can be considered more a specialist brand than a volume firm, 
assembled cars in Belgium from the mid-1960s.  
Outside the US and Europe, the only companies appearing on the list of the world’s top 
producers in 1973 were Japanese: Toyota and Nissan. Both firms began the production of 
automobiles during the 1930s. Starting in 1935, Nissan manufactured road vehicles in 
Yokohama, the same location where Ford had been assembling its vehicles for more than a 
decade. General Motors assembled its Chevrolet trucks in Osaka. Up to 1934, the two 
American firms together accounted for 90 per cent of the Japanese automobile market. 
However, since then, their share began to shrink, thanks to the efforts of domestic producers 
and the nationalist industrial policy adopted by the militarist governments. The latter included 
tax incentives granted to the Japanese producers, high tariffs and local requirements. It also 
implied strict restrictions on the import of parts and a prohibition on the American companies 
buying land. The result was that Nissan surpassed the US producers and became the first 
automobile manufacturer in Japan on the eve of the Second World War. Toyota reached 
second place.24 
The Toyoda family inaugurated its automobile manufacturing plant in Koromo in 1938. 
Although they undertook car production under a new brand, Toyota, they benefited from a 
fairly significant previous experience in business.25 The Koromo factory was planned to 
incorporate Fordist principles, such as the conveyor belt, that had already been applied by 
Sakichi Toyoda to the assembly of looms in the late 1920s.26 Moreover, Toyoda tried to 
complement its Fordist approach with its own innovations. Sakichi invented a device that 
suddenly stopped a loom when the warp was broken. The development of such an invention 
opened the door for the conception of the Jidoka principle: building machines with autonomy 
to stop automatically. Similarly, Sakichi’s son, Kiichiro, began to develop the concept of Just-in-
Time, by proposing to use materials and parts within Koromo’s factory in a manner of “organic 
communication” in 1938.27 A path-dependent pattern of innovation began to emerge at 
Toyota before Second World War. 
Even if Nissan and Toyota had built passenger cars before the outbreak of World War Two, the 
growing militarization of Japanese society increasingly favoured truck production for the army. 
Japan had held back on the mass consumption of cars for a long time. In the immediate post-
war years, most output was military trucks. However, in the early 1950s, the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI) tried to promote licensing agreements with foreign 
                                                          
23 Maxcy, The Multinational Automobile…, 102-108. 
24 Cusumano, The Japanese Automobile Industry…, 1-136. Reich, The Fruits of..., 278-291. San Román, 
‘Política económica y..., 74-78. 
25 Toyota CMIT, Toyota Commemorative…, 119-127. 
26 Toyota CMIT, Toyota Commemorative…, 280. Narusawa & Shook, Kaizen Express…, 52-55. 
27 Toyota CMIT, Toyota Commemorative…, 124. 
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manufacturers of passenger cars in order to gain access to technology, requiring 90 per cent of 
the parts used in their manufacture to be of domestic origin within five years from the start of 
production. Nissan signed an agreement with Austin. Toyota tried to reach arrangement with 
Ford, but finally preferred to continue with the development of its own technology. High tariffs 
and restrictions on foreign investment licensing were maintained in Japan until the second 
third of the sixties, by which time Japan’s car output had already reached 3 million vehicles. 
Such policies began to change, however, under pressure from the United States, and Japan’s 
tariff on car imports was reduced from 34 per cent to 17 per cent. 
Post-war scarcities encouraged Toyota’s efforts to create its own path of development, which 
began by imitating Fordist methods but then significantly improved on them. Kiichiro Toyoda 
died in 1952, but the engineer Taïichi Ono extended the Just-In-Time concept by developing a 
new method which reduced inventories significantly in manufacturing plants by using Kanban 
index cards, a precursor of modern barcode systems. Though the first steps in the use of 
Kanban cards began in around 1954, the system entered general use in all of Toyota’s plants 
from 1962.28 The second key principle of the Toyota system came to be known as Jidoka and 
entailed the design of machines able to detect defective parts by themselves.29 It also required 
autonomy to be given to teams of workers to decide on the speed of operation of the 
assembly line. In addition, the Toyota system tended to integrate the concept of Kaïzen, or 
continuous improvement, which involved the permanent search by managers and workers for 
new solutions to increase both productivity and quality in manufacturing activities.30 As in 
many other Japanese firms, Toyota incorporated quality circles, targeting zero defects in car 
production. As a result, workers’ teams met periodically to suggest improvements to 
production processes. 
It should be added that the Toyota system implied long-term cooperation between the 
manufacturer and its suppliers, by means of the creation of a kigyoo kereitsu (or vertical 
cluster of firms), which also induced competition among them.31 The share of added value 
incorporated by the manufacturer tended to be lower than in other countries and, as a result, 
market relationships with suppliers had to be complemented by joint projects to develop new 
products and processes. Moreover, as in most Japanese firms, wages depended heavily on 
seniority and a commitment to long-term employment was guaranteed by practices with a 
strong Confucian flavour.32 
The Nagoya-based brand can be considered both a Fordist and a post-Fordist firm. It cannot be 
denied that, for a long time, Toyota followed a strategy based on volume production of a 
rather cheap car, making an intense use of economies of scale in production. In fact, its Corolla 
model, whose first series was launched in 1966, reached a cumulative production of 10 million 
                                                          
28 Ohno, ‘How the Toyota production…, 116-134. Womack, Jones,  & Roos, The Machine that Changed..., 
48-133. 
29 Shimizu, Le toyotisme…, 13-23. 
30 Boyer & Freyssenet, The Productive Models…, 77-88. Shimizu, Le toyotisme…, 31-39. 
31 Shiomi, ‘The Formation of Assembler Networks…, 28-48. Fujimoto,The evolution of a manufacturing…, 
129-172.  Amatori & Colli, Business History…, 175-177. 
32 Morishima, Why has Japan “succeeded”…, 241-250. Koike, ‘Internal Labor Markets…, 29-61. Garon, 
‘The Imperial Bureaucracy…, 441-457. Abe & Fitzgerald, ‘Japanese Economic Success…, 1-31. Sugayama, 
‘Work Rules, Wages…, 120-408. 
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units in 1983.33 In a few years more, it would replace the Beetle at the top of the podium of 
the world’s best-selling cars: its cumulative production. In its domestic market the Corolla was 
to remain the best-selling model for more than thirty years. It would also decisively contribute 
to the conquest of the US market: Toyota’s exports to the United States climbed from 158,000 
vehicles in 1967 to 1.4 million units in 1978. Nevertheless, although the Corolla can be 
considered a Fordist model, lean production and the other principles of the Toyota system 
made the firm go much further than Ford’s European imitators.  
 
3. Departing from Fordism? 
 
If we look again at Table 2, it is apparent that Toyota was one of the clear winners of the 
stagflation slump, becoming the world’s third leading manufacturer in 1985, though at the 
beginning of the crisis it had already enjoyed a comfortable position in the ranking. But today’s 
leading car producer worldwide was not the only firm to improve its international position in 
the late 1970s. Nissan rose from sixth to fourth position in terms of volume.34 In 1985, Honda 
also stood among the world’s top manufacturers, although in tenth position.35 Today, Suzuki 
appears, as well, among the top ten car producers of the world. The improvement experienced 
by all Japanese companies tends to confirm that, in addition to firm strategy, there was also a 
country effect in the restructuring experienced by the world automobile industry. As our 
special issue is devoted to the European car industry, no article in this issue offers an exclusive 
analysis of the Japanese case. Nevertheless, we are fortunate enough to have a fruitful 
contribution by James Walker which tries to evaluate the effect of one of the key protectionist 
measures to be adopted in the West in order to facilitate the adjustment of the automotive 
industry to the increasing competition from Japanese manufacturers: voluntary export 
restraint36. As you will see after reading the article, the conclusions are not very optimistic 
from a European point of view, though the author focuses his attention on the British case. 
Walker’s work suggests that the worldwide success of the Japanese motor industry derived not 
only from process innovation, as most of the studies on Toyotism tend to suggest, but also 
from product upgrade. In fact, Japanese firms reacted to quantitative restrictions by entering 
new market segments such as 4-by-4 and luxury vehicles. The successor of BLMC, Rover, which 
had been a pioneer in the off-road segment, proved unable to take advantage of its former 
lead in this technology. As Walker’s article also shows, in new attributes as well as in engine 
size, the Japanese producers improved significantly throughout the 1980s, the period when 
voluntary export restraint was in operation in both Britain and continental Europe. 
 
                                                          
33  Cusumano, The Japanese Automobile Industry…, 122. 
34 Cusumano, The Japanese Automobile Industry…, 265-328. Hanada, ‘Nissan : Restructuration pour 
redevenir, 117-138.  
35 A few authors consider the experience of Honda in the world auto market as more innovative than 
Toyota’s own experience. See for instance: Freyssenet & Mair, Le modèle industriel…, 139-153. Boyer & 
Freyssenet, The Productive Models…, 89-100. Also: Volpatto, ‘The Automobile Industry in Transition…, 
200-202.  
36 Walker, ‘Voluntary export restraints…, 
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In fact, Britain showed the worst decline in Table 1 and BLMC had disappeared from the list of 
top manufacturers by 1985 in Table 2. The importance of this topic convinced us of the need to 
devote two additional articles to explaining the decline of the British motor car industry, in 
general, and BLMC in particular. The article by Donnelly, Begley and Collins deals with the issue 
from the perspective of the West Midlands, the birthplace of the British car industry.37 The 
West Midlands still accounted for about two thirds of UK output at the beginning of the 1970s.  
 
Donnelly, Begley and Collins’ research confirms that one of the major long-term problems of 
the British industry was the existence of too many factories in the area, preventing efficient 
use of economies of scale. Indeed, the total of 60 plants seems far too great in comparison 
with Britain’s main European competitors.  For instance, the Peugeot/PSA group, after taking 
over Citroën and Chrysler Europe, had around 30 main plants in the Old continent.38 Its main 
rival in the market of origin and a much less profitable corporation, Renault, had 44 main 
factories only in France.39 
  
British private entrepreneurs had been trying to deal with the problem of having too many 
plants to fully benefit from scale economies long before the 1970s crisis. Austin and Morris 
had merged as early as 1953, and Standard was taken over by Leyland in 1961. The process of 
concentration continued with the creation of two new groups in 1967, which become BLMC a 
year later.  
 
The article by Donnelly, Begley and Collins also stresses Roy Church’s finding that BLMC 
prioritised the disbursement of dividends during the years preceding its conversion to public 
ownership in 1975 and its fully conversion into the British ‘national champion’.40 It also 
underlines Wayne Lewchuck, James Foreman-Peck, Sue Bowden, Alan McKinley and Tom 
Richardson’s concerns regarding wrong systems of pay and weak management.41 In any case, 
Michael Edwardes, both chairman and managing director of the British national champion 
during the 1977-82’s period, is characterised as a turnaround manager. He began to close 
plants and sack workers on a massive scale in the late 1970s. He also opted for an alliance 
between British Leyland (the new name of the firm name since 1977) and Honda.42 The Honda 
Ballade model would be built at Canley and launched under the pompous name of Triumph 
Acclaim, though with much less success than it was expected. 
 
Later, in accordance with the new Tory policy, the luxury subsidiary Jaguar was privatised in 
1984. Since 1982, the company had been renamed the Austin Rover group. This new strategy 
could not prevent rapid decline: production of cars by the British national champion fell from 
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916,200 units in 1973 to only 396,000 units in 1984.43 Donnelly, Begley and Collin’s article 
confirms that the decline of the British automobile industry was caused by an inter-related set 
of factors: plants too small to reap the benefits of economies of scale in production; poor 
managerial decision making; and the failure of long-term strategic planning by entrepreneurs, 
managers and the government. 
 
Even more provocative is the article by Tomasso Pardi.44 Pardi seeks to dismiss Timothy Wisler 
and Roy Church’s insistence on the heavy legacy of the past as an explanation for the inability 
of BL and Austin Rover to recover during the 1980s. He tends to consider the subsidised 
establishment of Nissan in Britain in the first half of the decade as quite mistaken.45 His article 
sees the decision as the success of a quite well-organised pressure group, which was behind 
the Tory government’s action. Large suppliers of automotive parts such as Lucas, GNK and 
Smith Industries won the game and BL, which was interested in outsourcing within the 
continent, lost it. In any case, Nissan’s establishment in Britain, under the condition of using 
high shares of local parts, did not stop the decline of automotive production in the United 
Kingdom. 
 
However, it should be noted that the decisions to detach Jaguar from Austin Rover and later 
the privatization of Leyland Trucks (1987) and the rest of the Rover group (1988), went against 
the strategies which had been adopted by most of the main actors in the continent since the 
late 1960s. Volume producers had tried to enter new market segments and often to buy 
complementary brands, when it became clear that the demand for more popular vehicles and 
national markets were starting to slow down.46 Volkswagen took full control of Auto Union in 
1966 and NSU in 1967. Both were merged to create the Audi brand. Much later, in 1982, 
Wolfsburg signed an agreement with SEAT to commercialise the German brands and produce a 
few models in Spain. Later it took a stake in the Spanish firm, and gained absolute control in 
1986.47  Steven Tolliday pointed to the transfer of technology from the up-market Audi range 
to the Wolfsburg’s brand as the key factor in the transition to a new model of product 
development in Volkswagen.48 The takeover of SEAT also helped to consolidate its domination 
of the low-range segment of the European market.49  
 
Jean-Louis Loubet underlined the fact that the Peugeot family tried to create a French version 
of General Motors by acquiring Citroën from Michelin in 1976.50 Another significant step in this 
direction was taken in 1978, with the agreement to buy Chrysler subsidiaries in Europe. 
Similarly, the main French producer, Renault, was looking to achieve new scope economies by 
acquiring a 5 per cent stake in the fourth-ranked US producer, American Motors Corporation.  
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Fiat was also attempting to adopt a strategy of benefiting from scope economies by looking at 
higher added-value segments and taking over Lancia in 1969.51 However, if we turn our 
attention again to Table 2, we’ll notice that the Turin-based brand appears as another of the 
relative losers in the stagflation slump. It fell from seventh to ninth position in volume in the 
world ranking throughout the crisis. As is well known by business historians, it is not so easy to 
reap the benefits of merging when different entrepreneurial cultures meet. Mercedes Benz 
would realise this fact a few decades later with its failed attempt to take over Chrysler.52 
Nowadays Fiat is trying again with Chrysler. The article by Giuliano Maielli addresses this issue 
and looks for reasons to explain why Fiat, unlike VW, was unable to benefit significantly from 
the takeover of a quality producer like Lancia.53 Maielli has previously sought to explain Turin’s 
inability to readjust the output mix towards upper segments as a lock-in phenomenon.54 In his 
contribution to this special issue, he comes back to the question and stresses the fact that the 
survival of Fiat’s routines for new design selection triggered the lock-in phase in the 1970s and 
led to the failure of Turin’s strategic readjustment of the output mix. 
 
Maielli’s ambitious theoretical approach to understanding Fiat’s failure in the 1970s 
complements the work of classical economic historians such as Valerio Castronovo, who 
underlined the strategic hesitation within the Agnelli family during the 1970s. In fact, Giovanni 
Agnelli, in 1975, announced a relative reduction in investment devoted to the launching of 
new car models.55 This could be interpreted as opting for a strategy of unrelated 
diversification, which would have shocked the firm’s earlier managers, under the tight control 
of Professore Vittorio Valetta.56 The decisions taken during the stagflation crisis by Giovanni 
and Umberto Agnelli revealed serious doubts about the future of the automobile sector by 
encouraging the transformation of Fiat into a multi-sector holding company. The 
intensification of labour conflict in the Mirafiori and Lingotto plants since the Autunno Caldo 
[“hot autumn”] of 1969 might have helped to convince the family of the need to encourage 
unrelated diversification. During the three-year period 1977-79, a new wave of strikes and 
political terror, including the assassination of engineer Carlo Ghiglieno, increased the 
perceived risk of productive investment in Fiat’s auto division. Labour conflict culminated in 
the occupation of the Mirafiori factory in 1980 by radical workers under the leadership of left-
wing organisations and non- cooperating workers’ councils. 
 
Umberto Agnelli resigned as chief executive officer in 1980 and a new manager, Cesare Romiti, 
was appointed. Romiti reminded many of Valletta. Romiti successfully put an end to 
permanent labour conflict, concentrated the company’s efforts on cutting costs through the 
use of robotics and prepared for the launch of a new volume model, the Uno, which came to 
market in 1982. According to Volpato, FIAT was the European firm which made the most 
intensive resort to robots by 1983.57 The Uno, another blockbuster of the brand, would 
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eventually rescue the firm (with 6.3 million units produced during its life cycle).58 In the 
meantime, however, the company was saved by Italian public spending through the use of the 
Cassa Integrazione and it enjoyed large subsidies and credits from Brussels. Romiti also 
decided to retreat from other markets such as Spain, given the dissatisfaction at Corso 
Marconi with Madrid’s policy of liberalisation of the industry and the heavy losses reported by 
its participated SEAT.  
 
Renault’s image in Table 2 looks much better but it must be taken into account that the 
company was also saved thanks to substantial government support throughout the early 
1980s. Tomás Fernández de Sevilla’s article gives us a rather optimistic image of the 
internationalisation process of the Billancourt-based brand during the stagflation crisis by 
analysing the performance of FASA-Renault.59 In fact, Billancourt’s Spanish subsidiary recorded 
the largest output manufactured by Renault outside of France, reaching a total of 224,915 
vehicles in 1985, which accounted for nearly one-quarter of the production of all of Renault’s 
subsidiaries abroad (next came Belgium with 145,852).60 FASA-Renault showed itself to be a 
much more successful subsidiary than SEAT throughout the slump. Together with Ford and 
Opel, it significantly contributed to Spain’s improvement in the rankings in Table 1, 
transforming the Iberian country into the fourth highest European producer of automobiles. 
Renault was able to take full advantage of the Spanish potential as an exporter of small 
vehicles to the Old Continent. 
 
But, as Jean-Louis Loubet has stressed, Régie Nationale Renault’s strategic choices concerning 
internationalisation and new locations should be regarded in a rather critical way. Billancourt’s 
stake in AMC rose to 23 per cent in 1980 and reached 46 per cent two years later. The French 
company began by using AMC’s 2,300 selling points to export its R-5 and R-18 models to the 
United States. As a second stage, it then tried to assemble its R-9 and R-11 models in 
Wisconsin and commercialised them in the US market under the name of Alliance and Encore. 
A new AMC plant was built in Canada to manufacture updated versions of the Jeep. Moreover, 
Renault took a 20 per cent share in Mack Trucks, a prominent US producer of heavy lorries. On 
the whole, the French company, together with AMC and Mack, assembled an output of 
252,123 vehicles in North America by 1984.61 Facilities in the US replaced Belgian plants as the 
second largest non-French location for Renault’s assembly capacity after Spain. 
 
Renault’s high expectations for its North American operations were not matched by facts. 
Sustained losses from 1981 resulted in out-of-control indebtedness. In 1984, Renault’s debt 
amounted to half of its current sales. And, as can be seen in Table 3, Renault’s losses at the 
end of the international crisis still accounted for 15 per cent of sales. According to Loubet, the 
situation was one of technical bankruptcy.62 The heavy losses were only affordable because of 
the continuous support of the government during the presidency of François Mitterrand. 
Pierre Dreyfus became minister of Industry in the cabinet of Pierre Mauroy in 1981. At that 
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point, the Billancourt-based company obtained permanent financing by means of public credit 
and compulsory loans, despite Renault’s mounting debts. On the other hand, Bernard Hanon, 
the chief executive officer who gave priority to the conquest of the US market, accepted 
defeat by resigning in early 1985. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Margin rates of the main volume  auto  manufacturers during the stagflation crisis
Profits/Sales in %
1973 1985
FORD 3.94 4.77
GENERAL MOTORS 6.70 3.10
TOYOTA 0.79 2.34
NISSAN 4.54 1.57
VOLKSWAGEN 1.94 1.14
PEUGEOT/PSA 2.38 0.54
BLMC/ROVER 3.72 -1.01
RENAULT 0.41 -15.47
SEAT 2.81 -17.55
Note: Profit is defined as net income after tax
Sources:  Own elaboration from Bordenave (2000).  Catalan (2010).  Freyssenet (2000). 
Freyssenet & Mair Freeland (2001). Hanada (2000) .Jürgens (2000).  Loubet (2000). Shimizu (2000).  
 
 
Renault, much like Fiat, was confronted with recurring labour conflicts, beginning with the 
occupation of its main factory in May 1969. According to Michel Freyssenet, the company 
experienced a sustained labour crisis which structurally squeezed its profit margin.63 Renault’s 
chief executive officer, Bernard Vernier Palliez, was kidnapped in December 1975. 
Absenteeism reached 9.5 per cent in 1978. Dismissals were also strongly opposed by unions. In 
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fact, Renault, in sharp contrast to most manufacturers during the period, avoided significant 
redundancies until 1985.  
 
In the long run, Renault’s story can be interpreted as that of a Fordist producer (with popular 
cars such as the 4CV and the R4) which was already searching for economies of scope during 
the late golden age, when it launched several models for upper segments (such as the R12). 
During the stagflation crisis, it tried to move beyond a strategy of related diversification and 
combine this with a large step towards internationalisation by investing in North America. The 
strategy failed, however, and the company was saved only by strong public intervention (i.e. 
industrial policy) and by a new Fordist success: the R-5. This lower-segment model gained easy 
acceptance among consumers who did not have high incomes, such as women and students. 
The R-5 accounted for the increase in Renault’s market share in its main market.  
 
Fordism also triumphed in Spain during the stagflation slump, but at the cost of a dramatic 
shift in industrial policy which was responsible for the collapse of the former national 
champion, SEAT.64 In 1972 Henry Ford II visited Spain. He obtained permission to build a new 
factory in the country, which was to work with a lower national content requirement than its 
rivals (60 per cent versus 90 per cent of parts).65 The new plant would be built near Valencia 
and be devoted to the production of engines and a new model for the lower segment, the 
Fiesta.66 The model, which derived from the Bobcat project for a global car, was ultimately 
conceived as an improvement of the then blockbuster model of SEAT, the front-wheel drive 
127, produced under Fiat licensing. The Fiesta was launched in 1977 and helped to increase 
Spanish automobile exports, but it contributed to the fall in demand for SEAT, which as a result 
recorded dramatic losses (see Table 3). 
 
Whereas Britain’s share in Ford’s European production declined from 46 per cent in 1972 to 
only 21 per cent in 1985, the Spanish share climbed from nil to 21 per cent.67 Gérard 
Bordenave presented the results of the Fiesta’s launch as “a big success for Ford in Europe”.68 
Steven Tolliday confirmed that the Fiesta model accounted for the Dagenham-based brand’s 
sales rocketing in the late 1970s and contributed decisively to Ford Europe becoming the 
leading producer of cars on the Old Continent. According to Paul Thomes, the Fiesta together 
with the redesigned Escort model, allowed Ford Werke AG to compensate “for the 
disappointing sales of the middle-class models Taunus, Consul and Granada”.69 The new Escort, 
launched in 1980, complemented the Fiesta’s terrific success. It was also conceived as a global 
car. It would finish its career as another of Ford’s blockbusters, with more than 20 million units 
sold.70 Ford’s plant in Saarlouis assembled about 250,000 units of the Escort a year (including 
the Orion variant) during the first half of the eighties. It significantly contributed to maintaining 
the German branch as the main subsidiary of Ford Europe, accounting for 55 per cent of the 
                                                          
64 Catalan, ‘Strategic policy revisited…, 207-230.  Catalan, ‘The Barcelona Cluster…, 12-23. 
65 García Ruiz,  La evolución de la industria…,  133-163.  Catalan & Fernández-de-Sevilla,’ Die staatliche 
Industriepolitik und..., 254-284. 
66 Pérez Sanchó, ‘La industria del automóvil..., 127-166. 
67 Bordenave, ‘Ford of Europe…, Vol. 2, 286. Tolliday, ‘Ford of Britain…, Vol. 2, 144. 
68 Bordenave, ‘Ford of Europe..., Vol. 2, 276.  
69 Thomes, ‘Searching for identity..., Vol. 2, 165. 
70 Thomes, ‘Searching for identity..., Vol. 2, 166. 
17 
 
Old Continent’s output in 1985.71 In short, the rebirth of the Fordist strategy within the 
company which originally conceived the Model T contributed to restoring its profitability and, 
as can be seen in Table 3, enjoying even better profit margins than Toyota in the mid-1980s. 
 
Something similar might have happened with General Motors’ subsidiary in Europe, Opel. It 
also decided to build a new plant in Spain to produce another vehicle for the popular segment, 
the Corsa model.72 The factory began to operate in 1982 on the outskirts of Zaragoza. By 1985 
Opel had become the top car producer in Spain, with an output of 277,101 units. This result 
contrasted sharply with GM’s trend toward stagnation in worldwide production at around 7 
million vehicles, as shown in Table 2. The sales figures and profitability ratios provided by 
Michael Flynn suggest that the worst moment for the world’s leading producer during the 
stagflation crisis was 1981.73 From that point onwards, the main economic indicators of the 
firm’s performance began to improve. GM, as well as Ford and Chrysler, also benefited from 
the voluntary restraint agreement with Japan in the US market. According to Flynn, however, 
operations in Europe contributed significantly to restoring the profitability of the world’s 
leading producer. In the US, General Motors maintained its “Fordist” orientation by 
implementing its GM10 program, which involved using a common platform in all divisions, 
with the exception of Cadillac.74  The ratio profits/sales, compiled by Freeland, confirm that 
GM succeeded in restoring profitability to a remarkable level in comparative terms: 3.1 per 
cent of sales in 1985 (Table 3).75 
 
If Toyota, Ford and GM were among the best performers in terms of profitability during the 
stagflation crisis, and the national champions, BLMC/Rover, Renault and SEAT, among the 
worst, Volkswagen, Nissan and Peugeot PSA remained in an intermediate position. The latter 
gave priority to building scope economies during the crisis. Nissan and Peugeot experienced a 
significant fall in profitability during the stagflation crisis and their stories suggest that a 
related-diversification strategy did not always pay off. Nissan launched a Fordist model to 
compete with Toyota’s Corolla in 1966, the Sunny, but later orientated itself to rapidly 
increasing the number of models available.76 In 1967, it produced six models. On the eve of the 
first oil shock, the range increased to ten different vehicles. By 1985, the number of options 
had reached eighteen models.77 Moreover, the Japanese company, which already exported 
more than 30 per cent of its output in 1973, fostered its effort to internationalize. In 1980, 
Nissan bought a significant stake in Barcelona’s heavy vehicles producer, Motor Iberica.78 
Three years later, the Japanese firm began to assemble an American version of the Sunny 
model (Sentra) in Smyrna (Tennessee) and was preparing its establishment in the United 
Kingdom.79 Nevertheless, the clear bets placed by the Japanese firm on economies of scope 
and internationalization did not prove to be very fruitful strategies. Nissan’s profitability in 
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1985 might be seen as acceptable in compared to some other manufacturers in that year, as 
profits on sales stood at around 1.5 per cent, but it had shrunk dramatically in relation to its 
performance in 1973, when Nissan’s profitability indicator was nearly three times higher.  
 
The Peugeot family, as noted previously, tried to create a French version of General Motors by 
taking over Citroën and Chrysler Europe and launching the Talbot brand. This policy had a 
tremendous negative effect on profitability, although Peugeot had been the most profitable 
French brand prior to 1973 and the demand for its diesel-engine vehicles was encouraged by 
the rising price of petrol during the twin oil shocks. In fact, the PSA group recorded huge losses 
every year in the period 1980-84.80 The group decided to close Citroën plants in Gutenberg, 
Javel, Mulhouse, Clichy and Nanterre, as well as the Peugeot plant at Bondy and the Talbot 
factory at Linwood. By dramatically lowering the number of employees from 263,000 in 1979 
to 187,000 in 1984, Jacques Calvet succeeded in restoring the firm’s profitability by 1985. 
However, the margin, as Table 3 shows, was still very slim. On the other hand, Peugeot’s 
dominance of the diesel-engine technique showed the firm’s solid R&D capability, which 
contributed to its long-term survival. 
 
 
4. Volkswagen and German success 
 
Over the very long run, the most successful firm among European volume producers was 
Volkswagen. In fact, as Table 2 indicates, the Wolfsburg-based firm today shares the world 
podium in output together with GM and Toyota. The stagflation crisis, however, was not easy 
for the German brand to cope with. Volkswagen fell from third to fifth position during the 
slump and its profitability was also significantly eroded. But, if we look carefully at Table 2, it 
will be noticed that, in spite of the better performance of Japanese companies, Volkswagen 
was able to retain its lead among European producers, even at the end of the golden age.  
 
Our conviction is that the success of Volkswagen is explained by the interaction of two 
different sets of factors: on the one hand, the right strategic choices made by Wolfsburg, in 
particular since the later years of the golden age; on the other, the long-term development 
model of German capitalism. Beginning with Volkswagen’s strategic choices, studies by Walter 
Henry Nelson, Werner Abelshauser, Steven Tolliday, Ulrich Jürgens, Robert Boyer, Michel 
Freyssenet and Manfred Grieger have clarified which decisions taken at the firm level 
contributed to building competitive advantage over the very long run.81 As stressed above, VW 
used to be the most Fordist brand among volume producers in Western Europe. As Walter H. 
Nelson underlined, Ferdinand Porsche visited the River Rouge Complex in October 1936, when 
he was preparing for the mass production of the K-d-F Wagen.82 The next year, after the 
creation of the Gesellschaft zur Vorbereitung des Volkswagens, the Austrian designer visited 
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Detroit again and met with Henry Ford. The objective of his second visit was not only to 
become more familiar with mass production methods, but also to hire skilled labourers to 
work in the new plant being built in Fallersleber (later known as Wolfsburg). Although the 
amount of foreign labour which would be used in Hitler’s Autostadt turned to be of little 
significance, the episode corroborates that Ford and the US provided the key example to 
follow. 
 
Steven Tolliday opposed Mancur Olson’s thesis on the supposed erosion of the elites’ power 
by US occupation. On the contrary, the results of Tolliday’s seminal research tended to 
corroborate the stress in Simon Reich’s argument on Volkswagen’s fundamental continuity 
after the Second World War with strategic choices made in the Nazi period.83 It should be 
added that more recent work by Anders Ditlev Clausager underlines the benefits that the firm 
reaped from being freed from the control of the Nazis and also its relatively high degree of 
freedom at the beginning of the golden age.84 But Clausager accepts, as well, that a key feature 
of the success of the German Beetle was that it was a small car, extremely well adapted to 
demand in its domestic market. He stresses as well that, contrary to the model exported by 
Britain during the 1950s, the Käfer was also very suitable for export markets.  
 
Steven Tolliday, Ulrich Jürgens, Stephanie Tilly, Florian Triebel and Manfred Grieger agree in 
pointing to the recession year of 1967 as the critical date marking the transition from a volume 
strategy mainly based on the Käfer to a rather diversified range of models.85 Up to then the 
Beetle still accounted for more than two-thirds of Volkswagen production. Heinrich Nordoff 
had prioritised incremental improvements in the Käfer rather than the launch of completely 
new models. However, the demand for small cars was slowing down in Germany’s Miracle, 
whereas competition from Japanese producers in the world market urged a strategic shift in 
priorities. During the two-year period 1967-68, the fall in profits experienced by VW AG 
contrasted with rising profits in the holding company (which had fully included Audi since 
1966).86 
 
The new chief executive officer, Kurt Lodz, undertook a radical change in Volkswagen’s 
portfolio during the period 1968-74.87 On the one hand, he aimed at building new R&D 
capabilities by substituting air-cooled rear engines for water-cooled front engines. On the 
other, Lodz decided to look for scope economies and strove to conceive an integrated range of 
models rather than to develop a new blockbuster car. The strategy involved using all of the 
potential of the engineers of VW, Audi and Porsche working together. In the short term, it was 
an expensive strategy and Lodz did not survive in his post, but it allowed Wolfsburg to enter 
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the stagflation crisis with radically updated models: the Golf, the Jetta and the Passat.88 As 
underlined above, the crucial factor, according to Tolliday, was the transfer of technology from 
the quality brand, Audi, to its volume counterpart, Volkswagen. The strategy also included a 
model for the cheapest segment of the market: the Polo. Ulrich Jürgens categorised VW’s 
strategy during the stagflation crisis as “diversified Fordism”.89 
 
Up to this point, VW’s strategy did not look very different from that of Renault or Peugeot. Like 
its French rivals, the German brand also made a major commitment to internationalisation 
during the stagnation crisis, even if Wolfsburg’s attempt was the most successful. Like Peugeot 
and Renault, VW failed in the United States, but unlike Peugeot and Renault, it succeeded in 
dominating the Mexican market by transferring production of the Käfer to Puebla. VW 
captured critical market shares in Brazil, South Africa and Australia as well.90 Under the lead of 
Carl Hahn, it took a significant step into the Periphery of Europe by taking over Seat. The above 
operation would be repeated again with the purchase of Skoda after the fall of communism.91 
The pursuing of such strategy in the very long-run, explains the emergence of the Czech 
Republic as significant auto producer, which we can see in Table 1. 
 
According to Wolfgang Streeck, Ulrich Jürgens,  Steven Tolliday and Werner Abelshauser, 
another advantage of VW relates to its system of conflict resolution. Although Hahn favoured 
automation to compete better with the Japanese, he also emphasised the capacity of skilled 
workers to keep costs under control and improve quality. Streeck insisted that more powerful 
labour organisations and better representation of workers’ interests in Germany, in 
comparison to European rivals and the United States, made flexibility less costly and facilitated 
quality improvement.92 Abelshauser underlined that Wolfsburg’s workers cooperation was 
even more intense than German average because of the policy of the Industriegewerkschaft 
Metal within the company.93 In any case, labour conflicts and aggressive strikes never reached 
heights in Germany comparable to the episodes experienced in Britain, Italy, France and 
Spain.94 Evidence supporting this interpretation can be drawn from Table 4. 
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Table 4. Rate of inflation during the stagflation crisis (% increase in Consumption Prices Index)
Germany FR Japan US France U K Italy Spain
1971 5.0 6.0 4.0 6.0 9.0 5.0 8.0
1972 5.7 4.7 3.8 5.7 7.3 5.7 8.3
1973 7.2 11.7 5.6 7.1 9.4 10.8 12.0
1974 6.7 24.2 11.4 14.2 20.3 18.7 15.3
1975 6.3 11.7 9.4 11.7 24.3 17.1 17.2
1976 3.7 9.3 5.8 9.8 16.8 17.0 17.5
1977 4.3 8.5 6.1 8.9 15.8 18.5 24.5
1978 2.7 3.4 7.7 9.3 8.4 11.8 19.7
1979 4.0 3.8 11.3 10.5 13.3 14.7 15.8
1980 5.3 6.4 13.6 13.6 17.6 20.5 14.9
1981 6.0 5.0 10.0 13.0 12.0 18.0 15.0
1982 5.7 2.9 6.4 12.4 8.0 16.1 13.9
1983 3.6 1.9 3.4 9.4 5.0 14.6 12.2
1984 2.6 1.8 4.1 7.2 4.7 10.8 11.6
1985 1.7 2.7 4.0 6.0 6.8 9.2 8.5
Average 73-85 4.6 7.2 7.6 10.2 12.5 15.2 15.2
Sources :  United Nations , Statistical Yearbook . New York.  
 
 
 
As Table 4 shows, inflation was never out of control in Germany throughout the stagflation 
years. The average increase in the cost of living was about 4.6 per cent in the period 1973-85. 
This rate was nearly half the US, Japanese and French rates. It was also nearly one-third of the 
British, Italian and Spanish rates of inflation. Labour market institutions cannot be considered 
the only cause of Germany’s success in keeping prices under control, because the 
Bundesbank’s tight monetary policy also bore part of the responsibility. However, Table 4 
underlines the need to do further research into the origins of the German model’s success. 
 
Works councils have been pointed out as one of the key institutions to contribute to keeping 
costs under control in Germany. Their role was substantially expanded during the stagflation 
slump. Since 1979 new standard working hours and work allocations have depended on the 
approval of the works councils.95 Up to what point they played a central role in encouraging 
the trade-off between employment stability and better pay during the critical phases of the 
business cycle is still a matter of controversy. This is the reason why this special issue 
addresses the topic, with a critical contribution on the subject from Thomas Fetzer.96 The value 
of his article is precisely that it analyses how Opel’s works councils coped with the stagflation 
crisis by changing their priorities in the long term towards defence of employment. Fetzer’s 
work is also remarkable because it deals with the subsidiary of a company, General Motors, 
which has traditionally been reluctant to open its archives. 
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Tables 1, 2 and 4 stress the need to continue discussing the reasons for the success of the 
German model of industrialisation in the long term, which constituted the second key group of 
factors explaining VW’s relative good fortune during the stagflation slump. The traditional 
Gerschenkronian interpretation of the monitoring role performed by banks has recently been 
reappraised based on evidence compiled by Mayer and Whittington, which confirms that 
German financial institutions in the 1980s owned a much higher stake in industrial firms than 
their British and French counterparts. On the other hand, the multidivisional firm seems to 
have had much less importance in Germany than in Britain and the States and family 
capitalism remained rather healthy north of the Alps.97 Recent research also insists in a healthy 
capital structure and an extended number of subsidiaries as key factors for long-term 
industrial survival of German firms.98 
 
Michael Albert stressed on the fact that Rhine capitalism protected goods such as education, 
health and even the labour force from the undesirable consequences of a completely free 
operation of the markets. Werner Abelshauser supplied long-term historical evidence in favour 
of the thesis of the emergence of such a type of Rhine capitalism since the late decades of the 
19th century. He underlined the role of the Great Depression of 18873-96 in creating the 
conditions for the reorientation of the German development model to a coordinated 
production regime.99  Evolutionary thinkers, such as Christopher Freeman, have always 
defended the long-term orientation of German firms towards research and development.100 
Other interpretations, such as those offered by Gary Herrigel, Robert Rowthorn, Jukka 
Pekkarinen, Barry Eichengreen and Stephen Nickell, seem more in accordance with the 
outcomes of the main authors who focused their interest on labour market institutions.101 
Calculations of coordination indexes tend to confirm that West Germany stood among the top 
corporative states on the continent until the end of the 20th century.102  
 
In any case, Volkswagen, with a significant participation of public capital among its 
shareholders and rather strong works councils, did what British Leyland, Renault and SEAT 
were not able to do. It also succeeded in restructuring better than purely private firms such as 
FIAT and the Peugeot-PSA group. An important task for business historians is to contribute to a 
better evaluation of the share of responsibility for each firm’s strategy in relation to the 
potential of its country of origin. 
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Conclusions 
During the Golden Age, the automotive industry experienced an amazing period of expansion. 
Rapidly rising per capita incomes, the absence of recessions and the tendency to full 
employment encouraged massive motorization in the developed world. For the first time, the 
European working class had access to ownership of private means of transportation, thanks to 
the strategies of the European car assemblers which imitated the success of Henry Ford and 
his Model T some decades earlier. The key was to produce an extremely cheap model by 
benefiting from scale economies with Fordist methods (interchangeable parts, moving 
assembly lines, process supervised by engineers, standardization and high wage pay). There 
were examples of such a Fordist model in most of the large car producers: the Käfer in 
Germany, the 4CV in France, the Mini in Britain and the Fiat 500 in Italy. This kind of success 
was also replicated in Japan, with models such as Toyota’s Corolla. The European and Japanese 
assemblers not only tried to emulate Ford by introducing new methods of production but also 
took into account innovations in distribution and marketing, such as product differentiation 
and consumer credit, which allowed General Motors to become the industry leader by the end 
of the 1920s. 
Since the late 1960s, this process began to show signs of exhaustion. The demand for models 
from the lowest segment tended to stagnate in high-income countries. Full employment 
encouraged labour conflicts, pushed wages above productivity growth and tended to squeeze 
profits. Moreover, growing macroeconomic disequilibrium in a few key countries, especially 
the United States, made it increasingly difficult to maintain the fixed exchange rate system 
derived from the Bretton Woods agreements, a system which was abandoned entirely in 1971.  
In late 1973, and as a result of the Yom Kippur war, oil prices began to soar, increasing by 
fourfold in less than one year. This led to the stagflation crisis, which implied a fall in demand 
for most car models, an intensification of the labour conflict in a majority of countries and a 
further erosion of profit margins for the bulk of auto assemblers. After more than two decades 
of wine and roses, the motor industry had to design a strategy to cope with the slump. The 
stagflation crisis, characterized by the simultaneous presence of involuntary unemployment 
and high inflation, did not seem to be over until the mid-1980s. 
After comparing output levels in the main producer countries, before and after the stagflation 
crisis, it appears that the best performers were Japan and Germany. The less successful 
producers were Britain and Italy. Between these former extreme cases, there were the 
intermediate experiences of the United States, France and Spain. 
The success of Japan and Germany, to a large extent, derived from the strategic choices 
adopted by some of their main firms, in particular Toyota and Volkswagen, which today, 
together with GM, stand out as the world’s leading auto manufacturers. However, there were 
also institutional features which contributed to making Japanese and German companies 
better adapted to compete in the world market, which should merit some attention from 
economists,  social scientists and,  of course, from business historians.  Long-term 
commitments between employers and employees, and also between the auto producers and 
their parts suppliers, tended to be key features of the industrial landscape in these countries. 
For this reason, both countries were often characterized by sociologists and economists as 
corporatist states. Many scholars view the dominance of corporatist relationships in these 
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economies as a means of controlling inflation and encouraging the investment levels required 
to improve productivity during the stagflation crisis. Some economic and business historians 
furthermore underscore the privileged relations established between universal banks and 
manufacturing firms in Germany. Similarly, analysts of the industrial Japanese system stressed 
the role of banking houses within the kereitsu, the new type of group organization which 
replaced zaibatsu, after the formal suppression of the latter by General Mac Arthur shortly 
after the end of World War Two.  
By contrast, the failure of Britain and Italy derived partially from the intensification of the 
labour market distress in both economies and institutional inability to reach long-term 
agreements which prevented real wages from growing above productivity and causing profit 
squeeze. The same was true, with more or less intensity, for the United States, France and 
Spain. In contrast with Japan and Germany, the above five countries recorded inflation rates of 
more than two digits during the second oil shock of 1979-80, derived from the triumph of the 
Islamic Revolution in Iran. 
However, the strategic choices adopted by the key auto producers in any of these countries 
could moderate or amplify the institutional weakness and macroeconomic imbalances of their 
respective countries, as was the case. British Leyland showed the worst performance in terms 
of output among the large European producers. FIAT experienced a significant decrease in its 
world market share. Renault and SEAT were recording dramatic losses at the end of the slump. 
US companies were unable to avoid a dramatic squeeze of their market shares in America, 
even if they showed relatively good performance in the European arena. A full understanding 
of the stagflation crisis therefore requires a deep analysis of the degree of success of the 
strategies of firms during the period. This discussion allows us to identify at least five strategic 
choices with which firms were confronted during the period: searching for scale economies; 
promotion of process innovation; product diversification and innovation; change of ownership 
forms; and internationalization. 
Scale economies are of critical importance in the automotive industry. British Leyland had too 
many in the United Kingdom which were often also too small. With some delay, many were 
closed down, although this strategy tended to intensify labour distress. The second largest 
manufacturer outside the United States also closed its Belgian factory, contributing to the 
relative decline of the Benelux country as a car assembler. FIAT, which also was confronted 
with significant industrial conflicts, tried to reap scale economies by promoting the use of 
robots, a process innovation. Toyota’s solution was, among others, Just-in-Time, continuous 
improvement and increasing autonomy given to workers’ teams. Volkswagen and Opel, with a 
long tradition of looking for scale economies, also benefited from the incentives created by the 
German industrial system of coordinated capitalism and, in particular, a long tradition of co-
determination, and responsible decision-making within the framework of workers councils. 
They contributed to the moderation of working class expectations by shifting labour priorities 
from pay rises to preserving employment. Moreover, during the stagflation crisis, they 
recorded new successes with mass production of cheap models for lower market segments: 
Wolfsburg with Golf and Polo, amd GM’s subsidiary with Corsa.  Ford anticipated the latter 
move on the part of its American rival by launching the Fiesta model.  In short, the uneven 
patterns of success of Ford and General Motors, on the one hand in their country of origin and, 
on the other, in their European subsidiaries, confirm that the relatively good performance of 
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the above American assemblers was also closely related to the adoption of a neo-Fordist 
strategy overseas: launching very cheap models for the lowest segments of the European 
market, with the aim of saving costs by reaping economies of scale, in addition to resorting to 
the supply of cheap labour available in Mediterranean countries.  
The Toyota production system also implied innovation in process, although it was not the 
result of the stagflation crisis but rather a long-term path-dependent story. In fact, it began far 
earlier, with the invention of machines (initially, looms) with automatic detection of errors and 
the development of Just-in-Time routines by two generations of the Toyoda family (Sakichi and 
Kiichiro) at least and, later, during the post-war years, by the engineer Taiichi Ohno. It also 
invovled the building up of a vertical keiretsu, which contributed to cost control by inducing 
competition among component suppliers, and encouraging cooperation in long-term 
investment between the latter and the assembler.  Moreover, the Nagoya-based corporation 
borrowed some Fordist elements in its long-term growth strategy, given that the Corolla model 
replaced the Käfer as the best-selling model in history. In addition, the bulk of Japanese 
producers (including relative newcomers such as Honda and Suzuki) were also able to upgrade 
their products by developing engines of low petrol consumption and high pollution-control 
standards. They were also able to build competitive capabilities in expanding markets, such as 
water-cooled front-wheel drive engines and 4-by-4’s. 
Similarly, Volkswagen, the most generalist among German car producers, succeeded in 
replacing air-cooled rear engines with water-cooled front-wheel dirve engines during the 
seventies. Wolfsburg, thanks to the transfer of technology from its quality brand, Audi, was 
also able to make the transition from a single menu offer based on the Käfer, to a fairly 
complete range of updated products. The latter included Jetta and Passat, in addition to the 
two mass-oriented products, the Golf and Polo models. Such a strategy has been, correctly, 
categorized as diversified Fordism. 
However, it should be taken into account that the strategy to upgrade products by benefiting 
from the technology of quality brands from the same group did not always succeed. The 
disappointing story of Fiat’s takeover of Lancia, which is analyzed in this special issue, points to 
the need for business historians to understand the culture of organizations better. Similarly, 
British Leyland was unable to take full advantage of Rover’s lead in full-traction vehicles and 
Leyland’s traditional good performance in the trucks market. Moreover, the sale of the Jaguar 
subsidiary might be understood either as a way to try to restore profitability or as a political 
preference in favour of privatization, but it is difficult to justify in terms of long-term product 
innovation. 
Again the French, American and Spanish experiences achieved intermediate degrees of 
success. The Peugeot/PSA group benefited from its good command of the diesel engine, highly 
appropriate for times when oil prices were climbing. The Fiesta and Corsa, cheap models 
launched by Ford and Opel for the lowest consumer segment, began to be assembled in 
updated new green-field plants located in Spain. Renault also expanded its activity in the 
Iberian country, producing one of its best sellers there, the R5 model. The Spanish plants 
significantly contributed to improving the profitability of Ford Europe, Opel and Renault. On 
the other hand, their competitiveness caused losses for the Spanish national champion, SEAT, 
to rocket. 
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Efforts devoted to taking better advantage of scope economies by launching new models can 
be interpreted as a strategic choice in favour of related diversification. An opposite strategy to 
cope with the slump was unrelated diversification. For instance, the Agnelli family attempted 
to react to the profit squeeze in FIAT’s auto division by investing in other activities with a weak 
connection to automobiles such as electronics, artificial fibres, school and hospital building, 
underground equipment, publishing houses and insurance. On the other hand, they also 
transferred their stakes in car-producing companies located in Spain and Argentina. Given the 
comparatively poor performance of the Turin-based corporation during the stagflation slump, 
it seems that such a strategy of diversification did not pay off much in the long-term. 
The alternative was, as has been underlined, related diversification. Expanding the product 
range can indeed be considered to be a key feature in such a type of strategy. Extending and 
improving the quality of the service offered in the network of assistance was another recurrent 
path of related diversification. We already stressed that these types of response clearly paid 
off in the cases of companies which extended their range of activities under the umbrella of 
their traditional brands, for instance Volkswagen, Ford and Opel/GM. This was also the case of 
Japanese producers such as Toyota. The above cases suggest that we could conclude that 
related diversification and the search for scope economies within a main brand were better 
answers to overcome the slump than FIAT’s preference for unrelated diversification. 
It should, however, be added that this not always did work. Nissan expanded its product range 
from ten models in 1972 to eighteen models in 1985. Moreover, it was one of the Japanese 
assemblers with sustained efforts to conquer the international markets through exports and 
by establishing production subsidiaries abroad. However, Nissan had too many models to 
satisfactorily exploit economies of scale and experienced a dramatic fall in its market share in 
the domestic market. Consequently, its profitability significantly shrank. 
Another option was to pursue related diversification by taking over other firms. This pattern 
was attempted in France by its two main assemblers: Peugeot and Renault. The private group 
based in the Doubs département attempted to create the French General Motors by taking 
over Citroën and Chrysler Europe. The publicly owned company, Renault, acquired significant 
stakes in American Motors Company and Mack Trucks. In both cases, results were 
disappointing in terms of profitability, but losses were much more dramatic in the case of the 
state-owned firm.  
Patterns of ownership in the industry were diverse and, in a few cases, experienced 
remarkable changes during the period. Family capitalism continued to be represented by key 
western corporations such as Ford, Peugeot (later PSA group) and Fiat. There were also 
significant examples among the emerging leaders of Asia, with Toyota and Hyundai. 
Managerial capitalism had its most outstanding case in General Motors. 
Renault and Volkswagen maintained significant stakes of their stock in public hands 
throughout the period of stagflation, although they also tended to give considerable autonomy 
to their managers. Conversely, BLMC and SEAT undertook important changes in ownership. 
The British firm was partially nationalized in 1975. Later, it was renamed British Leyland and, 
for many, became the UK national champion. However, its market shares in the both domestic 
and international markets shrank rapidly during the slump, and pressures for privatization 
tended to increase, in particular after the Tory government took office in 1979. As some of the 
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authors in this issue suggest, both the conservative government and components suppliers 
might have coincided in welcoming the establishment of Japanese interests in Britain. 
However, British Leyland’s management also saw it as an interim solution to reach an 
agreement with Honda to assemble its Ballade model, initially launched under the name 
Triumph Acclaim. In 1984, the auto division of BL was renamed Austin Rover, whereas its 
luxury brand, Jaguar, was completely privatized and sold to Ford. Three years later, Leyland 
Trucks’ ownership was transferred to DAF. Finally, the rest of the Rover group was sold to 
British Aerospace in 1988. During the same year, Nissan opened its assembly plant in 
Newcastle. 
Since its creation, SEAT had the Spanish public holding company INI as a main strategic 
shareholder. In 1980, INI took full control of the firm, following FIAT’s withdrawal from SEAT. 
Two years later, SEAT signed an agreement with Volkswagen to commercialize some of its 
models in Spain. In 1985 the socialist cabinet, confronted with dramatic losses of its car 
assembler, decided to privatize and transfer the full ownership of its national champion to 
Volkswagen. 
The British Tory and the Spanish social-democratic governments alleged sustained incapacity 
of their respective national champions to restore significant profitability, and opted for selling 
their public stakes. On the contrary, the Lower Saxony and the French administrations 
maintained their respective stakes in Volkswagen and Renault. When the success of the four 
brands is analyzed from a long-term comparative point of view, it seems that the latter choice 
was wiser.  
Last but not least, internationalization was a broadly shared strategy during the period.  
Peugeot and FIAT seem to have preferred to give priority to grow by taking over national rivals 
(Citroën and Alfa Romeo, respectively) and were not very successful during the period. On the 
contrary, the Japanese corporations bought stakes in Western producers and opened green-
field plants overseas. Similarly, Volkswagen expanded the activities of its main brand in Mexico 
and Brazil and bought SEAT in Spain. The main US producers expanded their range of activities 
within Western Europe. 
Nevertheless, the sad Renault experience in the Americas underlines the fact that 
internationalization did not work at any price. The case of Nissan, which took over Motor 
Iberica in Barcelona and which opened assembly plants in Tennessee and Newcastle, 
confirmed that internationalization’s benefits were often difficult to capture in the short term. 
To sum up, comparative analysis indicates that internationalization was a better strategy than 
growing by taking over national rivals in the domestic market, but usually it only paid off in the 
very long-run.    
It should again be stressed that, apart from firms’ strategies, success in the automobile 
industry also depended on institutional features, which should also be priority in future 
research. In Germany, workers councils and co-determination seem to have played the role of 
moderating labour expectations. They encouraged wage demand realism in exchange for 
employment stability and profits re-investment during the slump. In Japan, the long-term 
relationship established between assemblers and suppliers, by forming vertical kereitsu, has 
been considered a significant feature of its competitive advantage. Similarly, the diffusion of 
quality circles and the reluctance shown by managers to sack workers during crises, 
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contributed to quality improvement and better ability to control costs in the long-term. 
According to some authors, at the end of the 20th century Germany and Japan were still 
representatives of national varieties of capitalism, labelled respectively Rhine and Confucian 
capitalism, which did not fit in strictly with the Anglo-Saxon model. Such an institutional 
framework helped both countries and their companies to overcome the stagflation slump in a 
fairly satisfactory way. 
However, institutions are far from being stable in the long-term. Starting in the second half of 
the eighties, Japan undertook radical deregulation. Links between the financial and industrial 
sectors became weaker. The relationship between assemblers and parts suppliers became 
more market-oriented. The re-unified Germany also seemed to tend to converge with Anglo-
Saxon capitalism from the end of the 20th century. Unionization declined and the power of 
workers’ councils was eroded. Labour market de-regulation resulted in new types of contracts 
and the diffusion of mini-jobs.  Universal banks weakened their links with manufacturing 
industry, and the capital they lent was increasingly devoted to more speculative investments. 
The German industrial model of coordinated capitalism based on high quality and generous 
wages was under stress. 
Since the late 20th century Toyota and Volkswagen, like General Motors, have invested heavily 
in China and contributed to transforming this Asian economy into the first world assembler of 
cars. Today, these three companies are the world’s leading auto producers. China, with an 
output of more than 20 million vehicles per year, produces double the output of America. 
However, to date, the Chinese market is mainly in the hands of the Japanese, German and US 
champions. The above triad of firms, together with a few more corporations from the same 
countries (such as Suzuki in India), enjoy significant shares of the auto market in the main 
assembling economies. 
Paradoxically, as far as Toyota is concerned, its rise to first place in the ranking of auto 
producers coincided with a dramatic long-term depression in its economy of origin beginning 
in the 1990s. The Japanese slump mainly derived from out-of-control speculation in the real 
estate market. It might not, however, be just a coincidence that the partial erosion of the 
institutional bases of the Japanese success ended up affecting its national champion. In fact, in 
spite of its zero defect policy and its canonical vertical keiretsu, Toyota was forced to announce 
the recall of about 5 million vehicles because of the mechanical sticking of its accelerator pedal 
in 2010. Later, Toyota also recalled vehicles (including some from its luxury brand, Lexus) 
because of problems with brakes and airbags103. 
The recent astonishing finding about Volkswagen, which led to the dismissal of its main 
executive officer, Martin Winterkorn, might be considered even more puzzling104. Wolfsburg’s 
brand and its subsidiaries had supposedly been cheating for years, equipping no less than 11 
million vehicles with software designed to conceal the true levels of pollution of their diesel 
engines! Mitsubishi also recognized that it had been giving wrong petrol consumption 
measurements, although these data were far less misleading than what VW did105. Again, it 
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may just be a coincidence, but it is difficult to understand how and why managers from 
countries characterized by high quality standards and a traditional search for technical 
excellence ended up adopting such a short-sighted strategy of profit maximization.  
To sum up, the articles presented in this volume and the above analysis tend to suggest that 
future research in business history dealing with crises and industrial restructuring should not 
only concentrate on analyzing firms’ strategies to restore profitability in the short-term. It 
should also pay a great deal of attention to the organizational culture of corporations, which 
might often be the cause for failed attempts at mergers and internationalization. Moreover, 
more effort should be devoted to the comparative analysis of varieties of capitalism. It would 
also be appropriate to try to incorporate the strategies adopted by governments, unions and 
component suppliers into the analysis. 
An additional interesting question to be addressed might be whether the second wave of 
globalization, beginning during the stagflation crisis, significantly eroded the basis of 
alternative systems of industrial organization which might have been historical alternatives to 
Anglo-Saxon capitalism. Last but not least, the competitive strategies developed by the large 
companies from the West and Japan within the most significant markets of Asia should be 
another important issue on the future agenda, given that an increasing group of these 
economies, with China in first place, currently, stands out among the main world assemblers. 
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